Recently, calendar spread futures, futures contracts whose underlying asset is the difference of two futures contracts with different delivery dates, have been successfully introduced for a number of financial futures contracts traded on the Chicago Board of Trade. A spread futures contract is not an obvious financial innovation, as it is a derivative on a derivative security: a spread futures position can be replicated by taking positions in the two underlying futures contracts, both of which may already be quite liquid. This paper provides a motivation for this innovation, demonstrating how the introduction of spread futures can, by changing the relative trading patterns of hedgers
In January 2001, Alliance/CBOT/Eurex (a/c/e), a joint venture of the Chicago Board of Trade and Eurex futures exchanges, began trading four separate reduced tick spread futures contracts. These futures contracts are traded exclusively on the a/c/e electronic trading platform, while their clearing is through the CBOT system. The underlying asset for these futures is a calendar spread position across two otherwise identical CBOT futures contracts with adjacent delivery dates. Thus, these spread futures contracts are redundant securities in the sense that the contract essentially consists of a long position in one futures contract, and a short position in another futures contract, with the two legs of the spread differing only in their delivery dates. In another, narrower sense, reduced tick spread futures contracts are perhaps not totally redundant: although the tick size of the CBOT Mar 10-Year US Treasury Note futures contract is one-half of 1/32 of a point, the tick size of the associated a/c/e
Reduced Tick Spread futures contract is, as implied by its name, smaller: one-quarter of 1/32 of a point. 2 Thus, reduced tick spread futures can trade at prices unavailable by taking the associated direct long and short positions in the underlying futures markets.
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Because the spread futures contract price reflects the price differential between two futures contracts (differing in delivery date), one would naturally expect the spread futures price to be much smaller than the price of either leg of the underlying spread. In light of this, implementing the reduced tick pricing may seem quite natural. Furthermore, the spread differential may even carry a negative price, depending upon the slope of the interest-rate term structure, for the case of interest-rate futures. 4 However, since spread futures contracts are redundant, in the sense that the underlying spread could be straightforwardly traded on other futures markets, it is not immediately clear why this particular financial innovation should be successful. Indeed, not only are spread futures contracts a derivative of another derivative (that is, the two underlying futures contracts composing the calendar spread), but the particular spread futures introduced to date are based on very liquid futures contracts. This paper examines how the introduction of this apparently redundant security can nevertheless change the trading behavior and welfare of hedgers in such a way as to make this innovation potentially attractive to a futures exchange.
As of now, a/c/e has introduced seven reduced tick spread futures contracts. Three have ever generated meaningful volume up to this time. Figure 1 shows the monthly trading volume to date for the first five reduced tick spread futures contracts.
As is apparent from Figure 1 Working (1953) . Also present are informed traders. Market-makers provide liquidity to the market, which is costly to provide due to the adverse selection of facing informed traders. Market-makers are compensated for this through charging traders a bid-ask spread. With competitive market-makers, bid-ask spreads in each contract are set to just cover the adverse selection faced by market-makers in that contract. However, if the cost of trading a calendar spread is lower in the spread futures than the primary futures market, then hedgers' trades will partially migrate to the spread futures market, leaving informed trading in the primary market. Furthermore, if the overall cost of implementing hedging trades falls, additional hedging interest may arise in the primary market.
Introducing spread futures allows partial separation of hedging and informed trading. Trading in the spread futures market is concentrated in hedging, and therefore supports a lower bid-ask spread. To implement this requires offering a finer pricing structure, or a reduced tick size, in the spread futures relative to the primary futures market.
A similar result may be obtained if bid-ask spreads are set by an exchange exercising pricing power in order to maximize aggregate market-maker profit. With these "monopolistic" bid-ask spreads, it is optimal to lower the bid-ask spread in the calendar spread futures, attracting hedgers, while raising the bid-ask spread in the primary market.
This allows price discrimination between hedgers and informed traders. Informed traders face higher costs of trading, and reduce their activity, moderating the adverse selection problem faced by the market-makers. The lower bid-ask spread in the spread futures market effectively subsidizes hedgers, keeping their overall trading cost relatively low in order to generate the hedging trade activity that market-makers find profitable. Since hedgers have the opportunity to adjust their trading to respond to the new trading cost structure, there will be a movement toward markets featuring relatively lower trading costs. In particular, since spreading is now more cost effective, hedgers are more willing to enter into initial positions that may require a later portfolio adjustment utilizing spread futures. This trading adjustment allows for a decrease in the aggregate cost of trading borne by the hedgers.
An important factor in the implementation of either such equilibrium, offering a lower bid-ask spread for direct trading of the calendar spread, is that the spread futures contract trades with a smaller tick size than the primary futures market. Even without the presence of the spread futures, a trader could, in principle, negotiate both legs of the calendar spread simultaneously in the futures market. However, the possible prices at which the legs can be negotiated is constrained by the tick size. By allowing a smaller tick size, the presence of the spread futures market allows a finer set of possible prices, and therefore a smaller bid-ask spread (lower transaction cost) in trading the calendar spread.
Excellent overviews of the literature on financial innovation are provided in Allen and Gale (1994) and Duffie and Rahi (1995) . Specific cases of innovations of futures contracts are discussed in Working (1953) , Gray (1970) , Sandor (1973) , Silber (1981) ,
and Johnston and McConnell (1989) .
This paper reaches the conclusion that the introduction of spread futures, which appear to be a redundant security, can change trading patterns and hedger welfare. Longstaff (1995) , for the case of S&P 100 index options, rejects the martingale restriction that the value of the underlying asset implied by the cross-section of options prices equals its actual market value, finding that the differences in value is related to market frictions. If markets are dynamically complete and options are redundant assets, then any option payoff can be replicated using the underlying asset and one additional option. Buraschi and Jackwerth (2001) perform this direct test, concluding that at-the-money S&P 500 index options and the underlying index do not span the pricing space; consequently, the options are not redundant securities. Bakshi, Cao, and Chen (2000) conclude that index options are not redundant assets, as the index level and associated call option prices often move in opposite directions.
There is also a literature on how the introduction of futures contracts may affect the underlying asset markets. A comprehensive summary of this literature is in Mayhew (2000) . One related paper is Subrahmanyam (1991) , which provides an informationbased model for stock-index futures ("basket trading"), extending Kyle's (1984) 
The model
The model contains hedgers, informed traders, and market-makers in an overlapping generations-style marketplace. Conditional on her information, an informed trader either appraises the next risky asset value change as having mean +θ > 0 or mean -θ (equally likely, ex ante), with variance kσ 2 . Therefore, an informed trader's gain from making a unit trade (of appropriate direction) in the risky asset has mean θ and variance kσ 2 (less bid-ask spread). 6 The parameters θ and k thus measure the mean and variance of the quality of informed 6 One possible underlying structure is that the underlying risky asset value change is equally likely to be +σ or -σ each period, and the informed trader, after observing her signal, assigns probability p > 1/2 to the correct direction of price movement. Then θ = pσ -(1 -p)σ = (2p -1)σ, and k = 4p(1 -p). Another possible underlying structure is that the asset value change each period takes the form Θ + Φ, with Θ equally likely to be +θ or -θ, and Φ independent of Θ. 
This initial position is non-negative, x(S, D) ≥ 0, and is thus a long position.
Symmetrically, for a hedger with endowment +E, the optimal initial futures position is -x(S, D), a short position of identical magnitude. Therefore, all H hedgers take an initial futures position with magnitude x(S, D). Of these hedgers, qH will be long-lived and roll over their position next period using spread futures, while (1 -q)H will be short-lived and simply close their position next period.
An informed trader with conditional mean +θ optimally takes futures position y(S) satisfying 
Competitive bid-ask spreads
This section considers the case of the bid-ask spread(s) for futures contracts being set competitively. Thus, the bid-ask spread is set so that market-makers break even in expectation. In the absence of spread futures, the breakeven condition in the primary futures market is 0 = H(1 + q)S · x(S, S) + I(S -θ) · y(S). (3) Here, H hedgers generate trade volume H(1 + q) · x(S, S); market-makers receive the bidask spread S per contract traded. I informed traders generate volume I · y(S); marketmakers receive the bid-ask spread S but expect to lose θ per contract traded due to information asymmetry. In the absence of spread futures, denote the competitive bid-ask spread in the primary futures market, satisfying (3), by S NSF .
In the presence of spread futures, the breakeven conditions in the primary and spread futures markets are
Here 
Hedgers are made better off by the introduction of calendar spread futures.
In order to implement the new competitive bid-ask spreads with the introduction of calendar spread futures, it may be necessary to reduce the minimum tick size. In particular, if the minimum tick size in the primary market was set near the competitive bid-ask spread without spread futures, then the minimum tick size in the spread futures will need to be set below that of the primary market. Thus, it is natural to expect that the spread futures will be introduced with the reduced tick feature.
Monopolistic bid-ask spreads
The section considers the case of the bid-ask spread(s) for futures contracts being set monopolistically. The exchange is able to exercise monopoly power in setting the levels of the bid-ask spread(s). Furthermore, the bid-ask spreads are set to maximize the aggregate profit of the market-makers on the exchange (who may, for example, be the owners of the exchange). In the case without spread futures, the optimization problem is
Max H(1 + q)S · x(S, S) + I(S -θ) · y(S). (5) S
In the case with spread futures, the optimization problem is
Max H(S + qD) · x(S, D) + I(S -θ) · y(S).
( The presence of spread futures allows market-makers to price discriminate between hedgers and informed traders. Hedgers incur a cost S in taking their initial futures position and an additional cost D < S if they roll the position over. Thus, the average trading cost for hedgers (including trading in both futures markets) is less than S, while the average trading cost for informed traders is S since they cannot effectively utilize spread futures. By price discriminating, market-makers can make trading more attractive for the desired hedgers and less attractive for the undesired informed traders. Price discrimination will be most effective by emphasizing a large difference in average trading cost between hedgers and informed, increasing S and decreasing D. Optimal price discrimination sends D, the bid-ask spread in the calendar spread futures, all the way to its lower limit of zero, and increases S, the bid-ask spread in the primary market, above its level in the absence of spread futures. Price discrimination allows an overall lower expected transaction cost for hedgers, so the magnitude of hedgers' initial positions as well as the total hedging volume increase with the introduction of spread futures. This is The monopolistic bid-ask spread in the primary futures market is determined by the tension between two opposing forces, the simultaneous desires to choose the bid-ask spread to maximize revenue from hedgers, and to minimize informed trade and its associated adverse selection problem. This tension exists whether or not calendar spread futures are present. The key variable is the average trading cost for hedgers; for example, this then determines the total hedging volume across the futures markets as well as the revenue market-makers receive from hedgers. Without spread futures, the average trading cost for hedgers simply equals the bid-ask spread in the primary futures market; with spread futures, it also includes the lower bid-ask spread of trading spread futures.
To maximize revenue from hedgers, the average trading cost for hedgers is set proportional to the hedger endowment size E (which essentially acts as the intercept of a linear demand curve in the presence of a monopolist), whether or not spread futures trade. To minimize adverse selection, the bid-ask spread in the primary market is set equal to θ, the informational advantage of informed traders. Without spread futures, this translates to an average trading cost for hedgers of θ. With spread futures, since hedgers do part of their trading in the lower-cost spread futures, this translates to an average trading cost for hedgers of less than θ. When E is large relative to θ, so the bid-ask spread is greater than the informational advantage of traders, and the adverse selection problem is eliminated, then the average trading cost of hedgers is identical with and without spread futures. Total hedging volume is then identical with or without spread futures.
When E is smaller relative to θ, the average trading cost is set at a weighted average of the "maximize revenue" and "minimize adverse selection" levels. Therefore, the average trading cost for hedgers is lower with spread futures, leading to higher total hedging volume with spread futures.
Similar to the competitive bid-ask spread case, even if the minimum tick size was near the optimal bid-ask spread before the introduction of spread futures, in order to implement the optimal bid-ask spreads with calendar spread futures, it will be necessary for the spread futures to offer a reduced tick, relative to the primary futures market.
Furthermore, since the optimal bid-ask spread in the primary market increases, only the spread futures, and not the primary market, need reduce its tick size.
Because the monopolist has an additional parameter to optimize over, the aggregate market-maker profit with spread futures, π SF *, is always at least as large as the profit without spread futures, π NSF *. The gain of the market-makers, ∆π* = π SF * -π NSF * naturally depends upon the underlying parameters. The comparative statics with respect to the various parameters are given in Proposition 3. From the market-makers' viewpoint, the introduction of spread futures trading allows price discrimination against the informed traders in terms of the bid-ask spread those traders face. Thus, the market-makers' gain depends upon the magnitude of the adverse selection problem, generated by the informed traders, that they face. This is increasing in the number of informed traders I, and the expected informational advantage θ of such a trader, and is decreasing in the noisiness of the information as measured by k. Similarly, since the magnitude of informed trade depends inversely upon the risk aversion Γ of informed traders and the underlying asset volatility σ, the market-makers' gain is decreasing in both of these parameters. The primary source of market-maker profit is the bid-ask spread received from trading against hedgers; thus the aggregate market-maker gain is increasing in the number of hedgers H.
Comparative statics with respect to E, the endowment size per hedger, is more complicated. As previously described, when E is large relative to θ, the average trading cost for hedgers with and without calendar spread futures is identical; the aggregate market-makers gain from the introduction of spread futures is zero. When E is smaller relative to θ, the average trading cost for hedgers is lower with spread futures, leading to a more significant difference in aggregate market-maker profits for the cases with and without spread futures. Thus, as E becomes smaller (or θ becomes larger), the aggregate gain of the market-makers from the introduction of spread futures becomes larger.
Of all these parameters, perhaps the two most likely in practice to determine whether a particular futures contract offers a relatively large magnitude gain for marketmakers, and therefore an attractive opportunity for an exchange to innovate, are large values for H or I, corresponding to a large number of hedgers or informed traders, respectively. Note also that a large value of H generally translates to a large volume of hedging-based trading, while a large value of I generally translates to a large volume of information-based trading. Therefore, recognizing that designing and implementing a new security is a potentially expensive process, the introduction of a spread futures contract is most likely to make economic sense when the primary futures market already exhibits high volume. This is consistent with the observation that the spread futures introduced by the a/c/e to date are based on some of the most popular (as measured by volume) futures contracts traded on the Chicago Board of Trade.
Conclusion
Since a calendar spread futures contract is a derivative upon already available derivative securities, it does not offer hedgers the ability to hedge any risks that they cannot hedge already. Furthermore, it does not make it any easier to hedge those risks: spread futures should be no easier to trade than the futures underlying them. However, the introduction of spread futures allows partial separation between hedgers and informed traders. This allows competitive market-makers to charge a lower bid-ask spread to hedgers utilizing spread futures, effectively lowering the overall transaction cost for hedgers. Depending upon the sensitivity of hedging demand to the transaction cost, the competitive bid-ask spread in the primary futures market may either increase or decrease. Overall, transaction costs are more favorable for hedgers, leading to increased hedging and an increase in hedger welfare. Necessary to the implementation of this separation of traders is the smaller price increment, or reduced tick, allowed in the spread futures market: even if traders were able to negotiate both legs of the spread simultaneously by trading primary futures in the pit, the cost of so doing (as measured by the bid-ask spread) may be higher than trading the spread futures.
Similarly, when an exchange has the ability and desire to exercise monopoly power in setting bid-ask spreads to benefit market-makers, the introduction of spread futures will lead to a lower transaction cost in trading calendar spreads, and partial trading separation between hedgers and informed traders. The optimal bid-ask spread in the primary futures market will increase, but the other results are qualitatively similar to the competitive case: overall transaction costs are lower for hedgers, the amount of hedging increases, and hedger welfare is improved.
The principal insight here is that the presence of calendar spread futures trading allows the costs imposed upon the market-maker to be more directly borne by the traders who actually generate the cost. The adverse selection cost generated by informed traders is therefore able to be at least partially controlled by the introduction of spread futures trading. As this cost is ultimately imposed upon hedgers (and, in the case of monopolistically set bid-ask spreads, upon market-makers), hedgers (and market-makers) are made better off by their introduction. Futures contracts which already exhibit a large level of volume, such as those based on US government debts, are more likely to be good candidates for the introduction of spread futures trading.
Optimizing (1) Optimizing (2), the magnitude of the initial futures position for an informed trader is
otherwise.
In the case of a competitive futures exchange with no available spread futures, aggregate market-maker profit H(1 + q)S·x(S, S) + I(S -θ)·y(S) equals
The competitive bid-ask spread S NSF is in the first region and satisfies
(Although bid-ask spreads above Γσ 2 E generate zero profits, they do so trivially, as they also generate no trade.)
In the case with spread futures, the breakeven condition for the spread futures market, HqD·x(S, D) = 0 implies D SF = 0. Market-maker profit in the primary futures market HS·x(S, 0) + I(S -θ)·y(S) therefore equals
The competitive bid-ask spread S SF is in the first region and satisfies
In comparing (A1) to (A2), they share the same quadratic right-hand side (cost function) and range 0 ≤ S ≤ θ. The quadratic left-hand side (revenue function) of (A2) is the lefthand side (revenue function) of (A1) shifted horizontally to the right. To see this, substitute S' = (1 + q)S into (A1) and compare to (A2). The left-hand sides of (A1) and (A2) intersect at S = (1 + q)Γσ 2 E/(2 + q). If the shared cost function lies below the intersection of these revenue functions, then the revenue/cost intersection of (A1) occurs to the left of the revenue/cost intersection of (A2), which occurs to the left of the revenue/revenue intersection; that is, S NSF ≤ S SF ≤ (1 + q)Γσ 2 E/(2 + q). If the right-hand side cost function lies above the intersection of the revenue functions, then the revenue/cost intersection of (A1) occurs to the right of the revenue/cost intersection of (A2), which occurs to the right of the revenue/revenue insection; that is, S NSF ≥ S SF ≥ (1 + q)Γσ 2 E/(2 + q). The relevant condition reduces to whether (I/kH)·[θ -(1 + q)Γσ 2 E/(2 + q)] 2 is lesser or greater than [(1 + q)Γσ 2 E/(2 + q)] 2 , which reduces to whether θ is lesser or greater than In comparing (A2) and (A3), they share the same quadratic left-hand sides benefit functions. The right-hand side cost function of (A3) is the right-hand side of (A2) shifted horizontally to the right. The revenue/cost intersection of (A3) occurs to the right of the revenue/cost intersection of (A2), that is, (1 + q)S NSF ≥ S SF , implying that x(S NSF , S SNF ) ≤ x(S SF , D SF ).
To calculate the hedger welfare change from introducing spread futures, first substitute S = S NSF , D = S NSF , and x = x(S NSF , S NSF ) = E -S NSF /Γσ 2 into (1) to find hedger welfare without spread futures,
Similarly, substitute S = S SF , D = 0, and x = x(S SF , 0) = E -S SF /Γσ 2 (1 + q) into (1) to find hedger welfare with spread futures,
Since (1 + q)Γσ 2 E ≥ (1 + q)S NSF ≥ S SF , the welfare change from introducing spread futures is non-negative. ♦
Proof of Proposition 2.
The initial futures position of hedgers x(S, D) and informed traders y(S) are given in the proof of Proposition 1. For the case without spread futures, aggregate market-maker profit from (5), H(1 + q)S·x(S, S) + I(S -θ)·y(S), equals
The first derivative over the region with non-zero trade is
The first-order condition implies the optimal spread S NSF * equals
where for convenience we define J = (I/kH) and e = Γσ 2 E. Note that θ ≤ e is the assumption previously made to guarantee that markets do not shut down from severe adverse selection.
For the case with spread futures, aggregate market-maker profit from (6), H(S + qD)·x(S, D) + I(S -θ)·y(S), equals
To optimize over 0 ≤ D ≤ S, first note that for any D > 0, the same revenue with lower adverse selection costs can be achieved by raising S and lowering D to keep (S + qD) constant. Therefore, the optimal D SF * = 0. Substituting back, it remains to maximize the following over S,
The first derivative with respect to S over the region with non-zero trade is
The first-order condition implies the optimal spread S SF * equals
using the J and e notation as before.
The comparison of S NSF * to S SF * breaks up into three regions: θ ≤ e ≤ 2θ/(1 + q), 2θ/(1 + q) ≤ e ≤ 2θ, 2θ ≤ e. To compare the hedging volumes with and without spread futures, note that with spread futures, x(S SF *, 0) = E -S SF */Γσ 2 (1 + q), and that without spread futures, x(S NSF *, S SNF *) = E -S NSF */Γσ 2 , so S SF * and (1 + q)S NSF * are compared. The previous three regions are considered. Calculating the change in hedger welfare from introducing spread futures is similar to the calculation in Proposition 1. Since (1 + q)Γσ 2 E ≥ (1 + q)S NSF * ≥ S SF *, the welfare change from introducing spread futures is non-negative. ♦ To show this for (1 + q) -1 across the region θ ≤ e ≤ 2θ/(1 + q), note that this term is quadratic in e, with a negative coefficient on e 2 . Therefore, the minimum value over all possible values of e occurs at an endpoint, either at e = θ or e = 2θ/(1 + q). At e = θ, the term has value (2 -q 2 )qθ 2 ≥ 0, and at e = 2θ/(1 + q), the term has value 4θ 2 q/(1 + q) 2 ≥ 0.
Therefore, the term is non-negative over the region, and ∆π* is increasing in H.
Now examine the second region, 2θ/(1 + q) ≤ e ≤ 2θ, where ∆π* = (1 + q)HJ(2θ -e) 2 /4Γσ 2 (1 + q + J).
It follows that ∆π* is decreasing in E, increasing in θ, increasing in J (and therefore increasing in I and decreasing in k), and increasing in q. Taking the partial derivative with respect to 
